1. A party to an arbitration agreement is used by other parties to appoint or participate in the appointment of an arbitrator as part of the agreement. 2. Before accepting the appointment as an arbitrator, a person must disclose to all parties to the arbitration all the circumstances that he or she is aware of and which may give rise to a well-founded concern about bias. 1991, about 17, see 11 (2). 24 A notification that initiates arbitration proceedings without identifying the dispute is considered to refer to arbitration all disputes that the arbitration agreement entitles the party who has the right to return the notification. 1991, about 17, 24. The majority called the case “a classic case of lack of scruples.” Recognising the inconsistent application of the doctrine of impitoyability in the preliminary proceedings, the majority reaffirmed the dual test requirement of unequal bargaining power and the resulting immeasurable windfall. The majority rejected the proposal for a four-year test, which would include the lack of independent legal advice from the victim and the strongest party that knowingly exploits the vulnerability of the other party. It also concluded that the unacceptable nature of a compromise clause could be considered separately from that of the treaty as a whole.
With regard to the unequal bargaining power, the majority considered that there were no “rigid restrictions” on this concept. The problem is that a party cannot properly protect its own interests. While the majority argued that standard form contracts do not in themselves justify the inequality of bargaining power, it drew attention to “the many ways in which standard contracts can affect a party`s ability to defend its interest in entering into a contract.” In order not to do the right thing, the majority found that it could either unduly disadvantage the strongest party or unduly disadvantage the most vulnerable party. The lack of an experience must be evaluated in a contextual way. In this particular case, the majority concluded that the administrative costs charged by Mr. Heller in advance, taking into account the small amount of fees likely to flow from the contract, rendered the compromise clause inadmissible. He found that the total amount of pre-feeding costs is close to Mr. Heller`s annual income and does not include other related expenses, such as legal fees. Brown and Cété J.A.
split up in the majority on this issue. The judge did not find the compromise clause unacceptable. In their view, the majority approach limits the use of arbitration clauses in model contracts and opens the door to the misuse of the doctrine of scruples, thereby creating commercial uncertainty. It considers that any restrictions on the application of arbitration clauses in model contracts, which are of major importance to the sharing economy, should be left to the legislature. Brown J.A. also rejected the majority`s extension of the doctrine of the unscrupulous.